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ALEXANDER HAMILTON FREY: HIS
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS
F. ODGE 0O'NEAI 1t
The art of teaching is the
art of assisting discovery.
-Mark Van Doren
Alexander H. Frey stands tall in the distinguished company of
scholars who have made the years since 1930 golden years for legal
scholarship in the field of corporations and business associations. The
giants in the early part of this period included Henry Winthrop
Ballantine of the University of California, E. Merrick Dodd of Harvard,
Robert S. Stevens of Cornell, and Norman D. Lattin of Ohio State, to
name just a few. Somewhat later came William L. Cary of North-
western and Columbia, Elvin R. Latty of Duke, Richard W. Jennings
of the University of California, Louis Loss of Harvard, and Harry
G. Henn of Cornell.
Possessed of incisive analytical powers, Professor Frey devoted
his vast talents to pioneering scholarship and early assumed the role of
innovator, constantly searching for new approaches to law study, striv-
ing for new insights, digging ever deeper to discover new meanings in
legal materials. By the beginning of World War II, Alexander Frey,
then in his very early forties, had become a nationally recognized au-
thority in corporations and business associations. He had published a
ground-breaking book of cases and materials on private corporations
and partnership; he had served as special adviser for a project to restate
the law of business associations; and he had written brilliant articles
on important problems in the field of corporate law.
Early in his career Alec Frey indicated dissatisfaction with busi-
ness associations casebooks then in current use.' "The grave danger
in the study of the law of corporations exclusively through the medium
of cases," he said, "is that the student fails to glimpse the corporate
scene pragmatically." 2 Existing teaching materials, he added, failed
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to raise important questions that had to be raised if students were to
get a pragmatic view of corporate law and practice. Among the ques-
tions he listed were the following: Is there any legal distinction be-
tween great and small corporations? 4 Which group of persons actually
constitute "the corporation," the shareholders or the directors? What
are the fundamental legal distinctions between shareholders and cor-
porate creditors? Is a legal duty really imposed upon a private cor-
poration if the only sanction is the possibility that the state will ter-
minate the corporation's existence? Questions such as these are of
course still relevant in the study of corporation law; modem teaching
materials, perhaps because of Professor Frey's suggestions, do raise and
discuss them.
Alec Frey also thought that the arrangement of the cases in the
traditional casebooks misled and confused the student. The orthodox
casebook began with a study of the "nature" or "characteristics" of a
corporation, that is, with "a consideration of the corporate entity view,
of a corporation as distinguished from other forms of business asso-
ciation, and of a corporation as a 'citizen,' 'person,' 'resident,' etc." r
This approach, Professor Frey asserted, resulted "either in the student
disregarding the purpose motivating each court in applying such labels
as 'legal entity' or 'corporation' to a specific fact situation, or else in
compelling the student to his ultimate confusion to attempt a correlation
of a conglomeration of cases merely because the opinions employ similar
concepts (for diverse purposes) despite the fact that functionally the
cases may have nothing in common." '
In 1935 Alec Frey published his own set of teaching materials,"
a teaching tool loaded with pioneering features. The collection com-
bined materials which had traditionally been presented in separate
courses on partnership and private corporations. The expanded use
of the corporation as a business device had so greatly superseded the
partnership, Professor Frey believed, that a separate course on partner-
ship would accord undue emphasis to that subject. Furthermore, he
was convinced that corporations and partnerships contained a common
factor-group activity-which could be more successfully presented in
a single course. In the preface to the new materials he commented:
Many of the legal problems of business associations are
sui generis; hence a methodical and painstaking collection
RId. at 637-38. 1
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and evaluation of new data leading to new principles is con-
stantly required. Only by parallel consideration of comparable
transactions by different types of business groups can an
awareness be generated of the influences molding the develop-
ment of this branch of the law.8
Another unique feature of the book was the grouping of cases and
materials by types of business transactions rather than by legal doc-
trines. As Professor Frey pointed out, the materials in leading cor-
porations' casebooks focused for the most part either on legal concepts
such as "de facto," "authority," or "estoppel," or on relationships such
as "director," "shareholder," or "creditor." "Such groupings," he
commented, "not only fail to stress the importance of the primary facts
of the legal controversies, but also render it extremely difficult to
develop the economic and social background of the problems, since the
successive cases, in such classifications, are factually isolated and have
only a verbal or conceptual connecting link." '
Before Professor Frey's new materials appeared, the principal
casebooks on corporations concentrated on cases, neglecting statutory
material and thus failing to expose students to the problems of an-
alyzing, construing, and applying complicated corporation statutes.
Professor Frey attacked this problem by distributing throughout his
book appropriate provisions of the Delaware and California acts and by
urging each student to equip himself with a copy of the general incor-
poration act of the state in which he expected to practice.
Professor Frey was one of the earliest writers to concern himself
with the accounting aspects of corporate law and practice. This
concern gave rise to another innovation in his casebook. He included
a substantial chapter on "Computation and Distribution of 'Profit'"
and introduced that chapter with excellent explanatory material, thus
giving far greater emphasis to accounting than earlier texts.
Professor Frey's innovative teaching tool has stood the test of
time. Now in a 1966 edition,' ° it is currently one of the most popular
and widely used of the corporation casebooks. Despite the addition of
co-editors and a disclaimer of "resemblance" between the new edition
and its predecessors, it retains the essential features that made it a
revolutionary book in 1935.
Before World War II Alec Frey had also made major contribu-
tions to legal scholarship through his law journal writing. In the
8A. FREY, Preface to CASES AND STATUTES ON BUSINESS Assoc A roNs at iii
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spring of 1929, Professor Frey published two important articles." The
first was a classic analysis of the shareholder's pre-emptive right. 2 At
the time this article was written the orthodox statement of the doctrine
of pre-emptive rights was that "every shareholder has a right to sub-
scribe proportionately to any increase in the capital stock of his
corporation." "
Professor Frey demonstrated that although the orthodox rule might
have been adequate in the early days of corporate finance, when it was
usual to have only one class of shares, it could not feasibly be applied
to modem corporations with complex share structures. He pointed
out the staggering number of possible combinations of characteristics
different classes of shares might have. A class of shares might be
voting, non-voting, voting subject to any number of conditions, cumula-
tive or non-cumulative, preferred as to dividends, preferred on dis-
solution, participating or non-participating, convertible or non-
convertible, redeemable or non-redeemable, no-par or par in various
amounts, and so on. Professor Frey concluded that in the light of
modem complex share structures the orthodox rule was either "un-
justifiably arbitrary or impossible of rational application." "' He pro-
posed the following pre-emptive right rule based exclusively on pro-
tection of a shareholder's proportionate interest in voting control:
"Unless otherwise provided by statute or in the articles of association,
every holder of voting shares has a right that the corporation shall not
create any voting shares, or other securities convertible into such shares,
without first offering to him that proportion thereof which the number
of votes possessed by him at a time reasonably fixed by the board of
directors bears to the total number of votes then possessed by all voting
shareholders." 'i
Although Professor Frey limited the rule of pre-emption to voting
shares, he supported the following companion rule: "No shares shall be
created at a price which would adversely affect the interests of an
existing shareholder as to net earnings or net assets, unless he is
afforded an opportunity to subscribe at the price offered for a sufficient
11Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563 (1929); Frey,
Post-Incorporation Subscriptions and Other Contracts to Create Shares at a Future
Time, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 750 (1929).
12 Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE L.J. 563 (1929). The ma-
terials for this article were collected largely in connection with Professor Frey's
work on the American Law Institute's Restatement of Business Associations, Tenta-
tive Draft No. 1. The substance of the article was presented as a paper at the Sec-
tion on Business Associations of the Association of American Law Schools, Decem-
ber, 1927.
13 Id. at 568.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 572-73.
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number of new shares to enable him to maintain unimpaired his existing
interests." ' This latter rule, Professor Frey pointed out, is infinitely
more difficult to apply than the rule of preemption and must be
meiculously distinguished from it.'
The second major article Professor Frey published in the spring
of 1929 dealt with contracts by an existing corporation to create shares
at a future time.' Before this article the subject of "share subscrip-
tions" had received little or no analysis either by courts or by text
writers.
The initial task Professor Frey set for himself in this article was
to determine when that totality of legal relations comprising "share-
holdership" resulted from a particular transaction; in other words,
what acts of the corporation and of the other contracting party would
be interpreted as consent to the present creation of shares and what
acts as contemplating the future creation of shares. He laid down
guides for making this determination. He then made a comprehensive
examination of the controversies arising out of transactions for the
future creation of shares. He succeeded, among other things, in point-
ing out that many controversies result from a deplorable lack of pre-
cision in planning and drafting share subscription contracts and that
major difficulties can be avoided by stating categorically when and
under what circumstances the other contracting party is to become a
shareholder and by stipulating expressly the legal relations the parties
intend to create.
In 1931 Professor Frey published one of his best pieces, an article
on pre-incorporation subscriptions.' This article focused on (1)
suits by the corporation against a pre-incorporation subscriber to
compel him to pay the subscription price and (2) actions by the pre-
incorporation subscriber against the corporation to compel it to accord
him one or more of the rights incident to the shares subscribed.
The article illustrates two traits that characterize much of Pro-
fessor Frey's scholarship-an attention to differences between what
courts and other officials say they are doing and what they actually do,
and a probing for the real reasons underlying decisions of courts and
other officials. Professor Frey pointed out, for example, that when a
corporation sued on a pre-incorporation subscription most courts talked
as if the corporation's "acceptance" of the subscription were pre-
16 Id. at 583.
V Id.
Is Frey, Post-Incorporation Subscriptions and Other Contracts to Create Shares
at a Future Time, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 750 (1929).
19 Frey, Modern Development in the Law of Pre-Incorporation Subscriptions, 79
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requisite to its right to the subscription price, but at the same time
these courts said either that the corporation's bringing suit was a
sufficient "acceptance" or that "acceptance" was to be inferred from
other acts of the corporation after its formation. These courts,
Professor Frey concluded, "while talking the language of offer and
acceptance, have in fact been developing a rule of the law of corpora-
tions, namely, that immediately upon its formation the corporation has
a right to the subscription price." 20 Similarly, in challenging assertions
by some text writers that a de facto corporation has no right to the
subscription price against a pre-incorporation subscriber, Professor
Frey carefully analyzed the decisions and concluded that no case
on its facts and decision, actually holds that a "de facto" cor-
poration cannot enforce a pre-incorporation subscription. In
every case examined, if sufficient acts had occurred to result
in the incidents of a corporation as heretofore defined, the
right of the corporation to the subscription price was upheld
unless the subscriber had some other defense than that the
corporation was subject to quo warranto proceedings to ter-
minate its existence.2
The article contains several examples of Professor Frey's tendency
to probe for the real reasons (as distinguished from the articulated
reasons) underlying courts' decisions. In giving the real reasons, as
he saw them, for the rule that a subscriber may effectively withdraw his
subscription until incorporation, Professor Frey commented as follows:
Perhaps an explanation of the readiness of courts to uphold
withdrawal of pre-incorporation subscription, at least until
after the corporation is incorporated is to be found in the
judicial consciousness or belief that promoters of new enter-
prises are frequently glib and persuasive individuals, and
investors gullible and credulous persons; hence the courts are
ready to give the subscriber a chance to amend an ill-con-
sidered decision, provided he manifests his change of intention
before the process of forming the enterprise has gone too far,
and the point of incorporation of the corporation has been
adopted as a more or less arbitrary "dead line." 22
In explaining the rule that a corporation has a right to the sub-
scription price immediately upon its formation, Professor Frey noted
"(1) that capital is the most desperate need of a newly formed cor-
poration, and technicalities of 'acceptance,' etc., must not be permitted
to hinder its acquisition, and (2) that when a new enterprise has
201d. at 1008-09.
21 Id. at 1014-15.
22 Id. at 1012-13.
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progressed to the point of formation of the corporation, so many
persons might be adversely affected in such various ways by the failure
of a subscriber to make his agreed contribution to the common fund
that the most feasible procedure is to accord the corporation a right to
the subscription price."
An important thesis of Frey's article was that the economic
structure of the corporate device, rather than legal rules prevailing
in other areas of law such as contracts and agency, should be looked to
for guidance in the solution of novel corporation problems. He viewed
the rules he expounded in the article as a summary not of a portion of
the law of contracts or of agency but as a fragment of the law of
corporations, "frankly self-sufficient and requiring no dogmatic support
from other topics of legal study." 24 He commented, for instance, that
pre-incorporation subscriptions are "in fact sud generis transactions
developing a law unto themselves out of the needs and customs of the
business community." '-
Another important article by Professor Frey, still as fresh and
useful as it was when published in 1941, deals with problems involved
in the declaration and distribution of corporate dividends.2" Professor
Frey pointed out that insofar as a conflict of interest exists between
management and shareholders the law has developed to favor manage-
ment in two important respects: (1) management is permitted flexi-
bility in applying accounting practices so that it can affect the size of
the surplus or net earnings available for dividends and (2) even after
it has been established that there are net earnings available for divi-
dends, management is given almost unlimited discretion on whether
the funds shall be distributed to the shareholders or retained in the
enterprise.2 7
Professor Frey feared that in many gigantic modern corporations
the complete discretion given to self-perpetuating managers as to divi-
dend declarations might enable them to build economic empires for
themselves by forcing shareholders continually to increase their invest-
ment "in return for, at most, additional pieces of paper euphemistically
called 'stock' dividends." 8 Nevertheless, Professor Frey criticized the
statutes which then existed in a few states curtailing the discretion of
corporate managers to distribute or withhold profits and entitling share-




26 Frey, The Distribution of Corporate Dividends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 735 (1941).
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directors have set aside reasonable amounts to be retained as accumu-
lated surplus. He felt such legislation might prevent development of
adequate reserves to cushion periods of adversity and might preclude
self-financing of sound expansion projects. The solution he proposed
was "to authorize the courts (or preferably an administrative body),
upon petition of an interested shareholder, to order the annual dis-
tribution of net earnings unless management could sustain the burden
of justifying the retention in the enterprise of all or part thereof." 29
This article also discussed the characteristics of various types of
shares. Professor Frey concluded that when disputes over dividend
distributions arise among shareholders of different classes, "the only
rational basis for resolving such disputes is by reference to the con-
ditions present and prospective that induced the offer and the acceptance
of those shares which are junior in time to the other shares involved in
the dispute." " He went on to comment: "The financial circumstances
accompanying the issue ought to shed important light on this question
of what the parties would have intended if they had anticipated the
problem." "1
A major contribution of the article is Professor Frey's statement
of the principle of dividend credit. He argued that whenever a cor-
poration fails to distribute profits in the fiscal period in which they are
earned, equitable treatment of all classes of shareholders in subsequent
dividends can be assured only if management is required to abide by
the following rule:
[I]n the absence of an unequivocal provision of the applicable
statutes, articles, by-laws or resolutions, the respective rights
of the various classes of shareholders to the proposed dividend
should be determined by reference to what their respective
rights would have been to an amount equal to the fund
about to be distributed, if all the profits of the corporation
had been declared as dividends at the end of each fiscal period
in which such profits were acquired. 32
Although the cases applying the dividend credit doctrine have
been confined almost exclusively to the rights of non-cumulative pre-
ferred shareholders, Professor Frey concluded that logically the doc-
trine applies as well to the rights of participating preferred and even
common shares to partake in the distribution of profits after fixed divi-
dend preferences have been paid. He pointed out that if the principle
29 Id.
30 Id. at 740-41.
81 Id. at 741.
32 Id. at 750.
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of dividend credit is not adhered to, the directors may divert earnings
from participating preferred shares to common shares, or vice versa.
Furthermore, on dissolution of a corporation having an accumulated
surplus, grave injustices can result to one class or another if principles
of dividend credit are ignored.3 3 Professor Frey's explanation of the
scarcity of decisions was that shareholders and their advisors have not
sufficiently realized that the discretion of directors as to when profits
are to be distributed need not include discretion as to who shall receive
the profits when distributed.
After answering practical arguments based on the possible difficulty
of calculating and keeping track of the amount of undistributed profits
to which each class of shares is entitled, Professor Frey noted the fol-
lowing advantages to the shareholder of adoption of the dividend
credit principle: (1) widespread acceptance of this principle would
result in a more liberal dividend policy on the part of many corporations,
as the possibility of favoring one class of shareholders at the expense
of another would no longer provide an incentive for delay in dis-
tributing corporate profits; and (2) the dividend credit principle would
probably induce a gradual simplification of share structures.8
After World War II Alec Frey continued to write. In 1946 he
prepared a booklet on significant developments in the law of private
corporations during the war years.33 Its purpose was to provide re-
turning lawyer-veterans with information on case law and statutory
developments during the time that they were in the service. Professor
Frey concluded that the dominant problem in the realm of private cor-
porations during the war period was the relationship between corporate
managers and the shareholders. He pointed out that a gradual evolu-
tion had occurred in the nature of this relationship, especially in large
corporations where direct "control" by the shareholders was not
possible. He compiled a long list of management abuses and called
for adequate machinery to permit quick and inexpensive enforcement
of the managers' responsibilities to shareholders. He also recommended
an authoritative analysis and statement of the functions and of the moral
or ethical standards of the managers of modern corporations, recog-
nizing the urgent need for a set of guiding principles for corporate
managers.
In 1952, Professor Frey, in perhaps his most hard-hitting article,
delivered a devastating attack on the "de facto" doctrine." The tradi-
8331. at 761-62.
84Id. at 762-63.
35 A. FREY, SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW DURING THE WAR YEARS:
PRIVATE CoRPoAToNs (1946).
36Frey, Legal Analysis and the "De Facto" Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REV.
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tional approach to defectively organized corporations-couched in
terms of "de jure" and "de facto" corporations-assumes that merely
by considering the character or extent of defects in incorporation, it is
possible to predict all of the legal attributes which courts will ascribe to
the association. Professor Frey pointed out-and this is something
which still needs to be brought home to some judges and legal writers-
that when a business association purports to be incorporated but has
failed to comply literally and completely with the incorporation pro-
cedures set forth in the general incorporation statute, it is not helpful
in solving the real issues raised to ask whether the associates constitute
a de facto corporation. Instead, questions of the following types have
to be answered: "Is the liability of the members of the association for
its obligations limited? Can an action be maintained on behalf of the
association in the association name? Can an action be brought against
the association without naming and serving the members individually
as parties defendant? Are the interests of a member of the association
transferable without the consent of the other members? The answers
to some of these questions may be in the affirmative and others . . .
in the negative, depending upon the nature of the defect in the attempt
to incorporate and other relevant circumstances." 37
Professor Frey believed that it was impossible to predict with
assurance the presence or absence of even a single attribute of incor-
poration, such as a limited liability of the associates, merely by dwelling
upon the content of a particular defect in the attempt to incorporate.
To test this hypothesis he gathered and analyzed all the reported cases
in which a creditor of a business association sought a judgment against
one or more of the associates ("shareholders") personally because of
the promoters' failure to comply with some provision in the prescribed
incorporation procedure. The purpose in collecting these cases-and
this again emphasizes a characteristic of Professor Frey's scholarship
that has been noted elsewhere in this writing-was first to discover
what the courts have actually been deciding (what facts have led to
what legal consequences), and second to ascertain why the courts have
decided the cases the way they have.
Professor Frey concluded that the de facto doctrine "is just so
much jargon and ought to be abandoned." " The presence or absence
of dealing on a corporate basis, that is, whether the plaintiff-creditor
dealt with the association thinking it was a corporation, is often a
factor of major importance in the courts' decisions, yet emphasis in the
"de facto" doctrine is entirely upon the character of the defect in
S7Id. at 1155.
as Id. at 1178.
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incorporation (that is, the talk is about such matters as "colorable"
compliance with the statute) and not at all upon the nature of the
parties' dealings. He pointed out, for example, that if prior to the
transaction with the plaintiff the articles of incorporation have not
been recorded at all, either with the secretary of state or locally in a
designated county office, but the dealings with plaintiff were on a
corporate basis, an action by plaintiff to hold the associates personally
liable has little more than an even chance of success. On the other
hand, under the de facto doctrine failure to record the articles at all,
one might reasonably assume, "would be regarded by practically all
judges as not constituting a 'colorable' attempt to incorporate and
therefore as not extending to defendants the immunity granted by the
de facto doctrine." "
For those to whom the thought of abandoning the de facto doctrine
was repugnant, Professor Frey culled from the decisions two propo-
sitions for the limited purpose of determining the presence or absence
of limited liability: (1) an association which has recorded the articles
of incorporation with the secretary of state is a de facto corporation,
and the shareholders have limited liability if the dealings were on a
corporate basis; and (2) an association which has made no attempt to
incorporate is not a de facto corporation, and the associates are per-
sonally liable irrespective of whether the dealings were on a corporate
basis.40 He hastened to add, however, that even in this formulation,
nothing is gained or clarified by including the statement that the
association "is a de facto corporation" or that it "is not a de facto cor-
poration." Omit these clauses and the propositions are just as mean-
ingful. In other words, he concluded that the statement that the asso-
ciation is or is not a de facto corporation is literally nothing more than
a somewhat obscure way of stating that the associates do or do not
enjoy limited liability.
Professor Frey also decided that the "de facto" statement can be
positively misleading. His reasoning was as follows:
A case which states that, if the articles are recorded locally but
not with the secretary of state, the associates are personally
liable, is not likely to be cited for the proposition that such an
association cannot acquire real property in the association
name because this is so obviously a different issue. But if the
first case states that the association in question is not a "de
facto" corporation and "therefore" the associates are per-
sonally liable, those who do not concentrate on the purpose
for which the association was judicially referred to as not
39 Id. at 1176.
40 Id. at 1178.
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a "de facto" corporation may be tempted subsequently to
cite the case for the proposition that such a defectively incor-
porated association is not a "de facto" corporation and "there-
fore" it cannot acquire real property in its association name."
When Professor Frey came to inquire into the "why" of the
courts' decisions, he concluded that the courts, relying verbally on the
de facto doctrine, have rarely given either the real reasons or good
reasons for their decisions. He found hope, however, in modem cor-
poration statutes, which removed some of the pitfalls in the incor-
poration process, since these statutes were rapidly minimizing the
number of defective incorporations and, one hopes, relegating the
de facto doctrine to "an historic relic of legal conceptualism at its
worst." 42
Another major law journal article by Professor Frey dealt with
federal regulations affecting the over-the-counter purchase and sale of
existing securities. 3 This article first pointed out the need for federal
regulation because of the inadequacy of the common-law remedies and
of state blue-sky laws. It then discussed federal regulation of mis-
representation, manipulation, and non-disclosure in over-the-counter
transactions. Included were concise but useful discussions of such
devices as wash sales, matched orders, manipulative pool operations,
puts, calls, spreads, straddles, short sales, and stop-loss orders. The
article next covered federal regulation of malpractice by brokers,
dealers, and broker-dealers in over-the-counter transactions. Finally,
it discussed self-regulation of the over-the-counter securities market,
especially the National Association of Securities Dealers.
In this article, Professor Frey recommended that federal registra-
tion, reporting and proxy regulations be extended to securities traded
over the counter.4" This suggestion was followed in large part by
Congress a few years later in the Securities Act amendments of 1964."
Another suggestion by Professor Frey-that the SEC statutes be
amended "so as to broaden the civil liability provisions and expressly
to include civil liability as a remedy in all appropriate situations" '-
has not resulted in legislation, but the suggested result has been




43 Frey, Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Market, 106
U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1957).
4Id. at 48-49.
45 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964) (proxies); 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1964) (registration);
15 U.S.C. § 78m (1964) (reports).
46 Frey, supra note 43, at 50.
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It is difficult in the course of a short essay to impart a sense of
the magnitude and impact of Alexander Frey's scholarship. He has
contributed as many new ideas to the law of corporations and business
associations as any man of his generation. His casebook is one of the
most popular in the field. His articles, even the earliest, are still fresh
and useful. His views are extensively cited in current teaching ma-
terials and texts, and much of his thinking has found its way into
current statutes. I salute Professor Frey for his singularly distin-
guished contributions to the law of corporations and business
associations.
